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BRIEF OF INTERVENOR 
INTRODUCTION 
Alan V. Funk, the Receiver appointed over the 49th Street Galleria, and an 
intervening party in the above-entitled action (the "Receiver"), hereby respectfully submits 
his Brief of Intervenor. 
JURISDICTION 
1 lie I Jtah Cc i n I: c f Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pi n si la lit to I Jtah Code 
§78-2-2(4). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
L Whether the obligation to collect and remit sales tax extends to the activities 
of roller skating, laser tag and batting cages? 
II. Whethe i finding t! nller skating, laser tag and batting cage receipts 
are subject to sales tax, is the method of collection by the Utah State Tax Commission 
^ i n l . i l h u l Ilk1 tin*, ifi'HM n'ss < 1111is*. J i l t ! l l i e e q u a l j i i i i l t i tioiiii r l a i i s e iiiil tlliir I  l l l i A n u M u l i n u i t 
of the U.S. Constitution? 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
U.S. Constitution, Amendment XIV, Section 1, in pertinent part: 
No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
1 
Utah Code Annotated §59-12-103(l)1, in pertinent part: 
There is levied a tax on the purchaser for the amount paid or charged for the 
following: 
(f) admission to any place of amusement, entertainment, or 
recreation, including seats and tables reserved or otherwise, and 
other similar accommodations. 
Utah Admin. Code Rule R865-19-33S, in pertinent part: 
A. "Admission" means the right or privilege to enter into a place. Admission 
includes the amount paid for the right to use a reserved seat or any seat in an 
auditorium, theatre, circus, stadium, schoolhouse, meeting house, or 
gymnasium to view any type of entertainment. Admission also includes the 
right to use a table at a night club, hotel, or roof garden whether such charge 
is designated as a cover charge, minimum charge, or any such similar charge. 
Utah Admin. Code Rule R865-19-34S, in pertinent part: 
A. The phrase "place of amusement, entertainment, or recreation" is broad 
in meaning but conveys the basic idea of a definite location. 
B. The amount paid for admission to such a place is subject to the tax, even 
though such charge includes the right of the purchaser to participate in some 
activity within the place. For example, the sale of a ticket for a ride upon a 
mechanical or self-operated device is an admission to a place of amusement. 
C. Charges for admissions to swimming pools, skating rinks, and other places 
of amusement are subject to the tax. Charges for towel rentals, swimming suit 
rentals, skate rentals, etc., are also subject to tax. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
In the spring of 1984, The 49th Street Galleria (the "Galleria") opened for business 
in Murray City, Utah. 
*A11 future references are to the Utah Code Annotated (1992) unless otherwise 
identified. 
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The Galleria initially offered bowling, roller skating, miniature golf, baseball pitching 
machines, video games and food stations. 
Admission to the Galleria is free with charges being imposed for each of the activities 
in which a patron desires to participate. Additionally, patrons of the Galleria are free to 
use without charge, numerous tables, chairs and benches located throughout the Galleria. 
In the spring of 1984, the Galleria requested the Audit Division of the Utah State 
Tax Commission (the "Tax Commission") to make a determination of whether the planned 
recreational activities would be subject to Utah Sales Tax. 
In May of 1984, Kenneth Cook of the Tax Commission informed the Galleria that 
receipts from the batting cages and roller skating would be subject to Utah Sales Tax. 
Believing the previous determination was inaccurate and/or poorly reasoned, the 
Galleria requested an additional review of its operations by the Tax Commission. 
On August 2, 1984, George M. Loertscher, Office Auditor of the Tax Commission, 
informed the Galleria that the batting cages, miniature golfing, roller skating, bowling and 
speed pitching (radar gun) were not subject to sales tax, however the rental of equipment 
was subject to such tax. 
Believing this information to be the definitive word, the Galleria did not collect sales 
tax on any of the activities identified in Loertscher's letter. 
At the request of the Galleria, the Tax Commission requested the Attorney General's 
office to prepare an opinion regarding the application of sales tax to the Galleria's activities. 
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An "Informal Opinion" was prepared by the Attorney General's office in September, 
1985. The conclusions of the report were unfavorable to the Tax Commission's current 
methods of imposition and collection of sales tax and the Tax Commission requested the 
Attorney General's office to reconsider the matter. Thereafter, no formal opinion was 
prepared or released. 
Subsequent to its opening, the Galleria added a laser chase game to its activities 
portfolio. 
Based on Loertscher's letter that no other activities in the Galleria were subject to 
sales tax, the Galleria reasonably believed that the laser chase game was also not subject 
to sales tax. 
In late 1989 or early 1990, the Tax Commission audited the Galleria and assessed 
additional sales tax on the Galleria's receipts from its batting cages, amusement rides, roller 
skating rink, laser chase game and food sales. 
The Galleria has appealed the Tax Commission's determination that receipts from 
its batting cages, roller skating rink and laser chase game are subject to Utah Sales Tax. 
Having exhausted its administrative remedies, the Galleria now appeals the Tax 
Commission's determination to this Court. 
ARGUMENT SUMMARY 
Based upon: (a) the time in which the statute was passed, (b) the context in which 
the word "including" is used, (c) the use of the word "including" in other statutes and (d) well 
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established guidelines of statutory interpretation, the 1933 Utah Legislature used "including" 
in the statute as a word of limitation and only admissions to activities involving the use of 
seats and tables are subject to sales tax. 
Additionally, the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment is violated since 
similar activities are treated differently without any justification. 
Finally, the due process clause of the 14th Amendment is violated since the 
application of the statute is unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious. The collection of sales 
tax from only some of the class allegedly subject to sales tax, eviscerates the objective of the 
tax raising statute. 
ARGUMENT DETAIL 
I. THE LEGISLATURE INTENDED "INCLUDING" AS LIMITING THE 
SCOPE OF ACTIVITIES UPON WHICH SALES TAX IS IMPOSED 
The statute provides that receipts from "admission to any place of amusement, 
entertainment, or recreation, including seats and tables reserved or otherwise, and other 
similar accommodations" shall be subject to sales tax. Whether receipts from Galleria 
activities are subject to sales tax depends upon whether the 1933 Legislature used the word 
"including" as a word of enlargement or a word of limitation. The 1933 Utah Legislature 
used "including" as a word of limitation based upon: (a) the time in which the statute was 
passed, (b) the context in which the word "including" is used, (c) the use of the word 
"including" in other statutes and (d) well established guidelines of statutory interpretation. 
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A. The 1933 Legislature Enumerated All Activities Intended to be Subject to 
Sales Tax, 
In 1933 when the legislature passed the sales tax provision at issue, most if not all 
places of "amusement, entertainment, or recreation" involved the use of seats, tables or 
accommodations similar to seats and tables. Most entertainment consisted of sporting 
events, the theater or motion pictures. While Utah is a state in which many of its residents 
believe prophets reside, its politicians have never been held in such high regard. The 1933 
Legislature could not foresee the day of laser tag, batting cages, miniature golf, video games, 
speed pitching (radar guns) and the like. The legislature intended to impose sales tax on 
the activities with which they were familiar; movies, the theater and sporting events. 
B. The Context in which "Including* is Used Suggests it is a Word of Limitation, 
The Receiver acknowledges that the word "including" can be used as a word of 
enlargement or as a work of limitation. As stated by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. 
Montello Salt Co., 98 P. 549, 551 (1908), revU 221 U.S. 452 (1911): 
The word "including" is susceptible of different shades of 
meaning. Common usage has given it different meaning. It 
may be used in the sense to comprise or embrace, as this 
volume includes all his works . . .; to confine or to contain, as 
the shell of a nut includes the kernel . . .; to express the idea 
that a thing in question constitutes a part only of the contents 
of some other thing . . .; as a word of enlargement, and in 
ordinary signification implying that something else has been 
given beyond the general language which precedes i t . . . ; to add 
to the general clause a species which does not naturally belong 
to i t . . . ; and as the equivalent of "also". . . . 
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The subsequent reversal of the Utah court in this case resulted from the Utah court's 
belief that "including" was used as a word of enlargement while the U.S. Supreme Court 
found that "including" was used as a word of limitation. Both the Utah and U.S. Supreme 
Courts have stated that "including" has many meanings including one of limitation. In 
general usage, when "including" is used as a term of enlargement, it will be followed by a 
series of enumerated items. However, in the statute, the only item listed as subject to sales 
tax is admissions requiring the use of "seats and tables" and accommodations similar thereto. 
Therefore, the legislature has used the term "including" as a word of limitation, not 
enlargement. 
C. The Use of "Including" as a Word of Enlargement in Other Statutes Suggests 
it is not a Word of Enlargement in This Case, 
The statute imposing sales tax on admissions to "amusements, entertainment, or 
recreation" has been revised at least 23 times by subsequent legislatures. Certainly, there 
has been ample opportunity for subsequent legislatures to clear up any ambiguity regarding 
the use of "including" if they had so chosen. Furthermore, there is ample evidence that the 
legislature understands how to clearly use the word "including" as a word of enlargement.2 
2The Receiver conducted a Lexis search to determine the frequency which the phrase 
"including, but not limited to" has been used in the Utah Code Annotated. Such search 
identified 284 references to such a phrase. Additionally, to determine that these references 
were to current statutory law and not merely referenced in the annotations, the Receiver 
reviewed the first twenty citations. Nineteen of the first twenty citations referenced this 
term "including but not limited to" in the body of the statute. Thus, 95%, or approximately 
270 times, the Legislature has used "including" as a term of enlargement. Having failed to 
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In fact, Title 59 of the Utah Code governing revenue and taxation, including sales tax, 
contains at least two references to the phrase "including but not limited to." See §59-2-
1202(6) and §59-18-105(1). Having never elected to revise the statute to expand its 
application while obviously knowing how to remove any ambiguity regarding "including," is 
further support for finding the legislature knowingly used "including" as a word of limitation. 
D. Statutory Interpretation Requires a Finding that "Including" is a Word of 
Limitation, 
It is well-settled law that ambiguous taxing statutes must be construed in favor of the 
taxpayer. As stated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Gould v. Gould. 245 U.S. 151, 153 
(1917): 
In the interpretation of statutes levying taxes it is the 
established rule not to extend their provisions, by implication, 
beyond the clear import of the language used, or to enlarge 
their operations so as to embrace matters not specifically 
pointed out. In case of doubt they are construed most strongly 
against the government, and in favor of the citizen. (Citations 
omitted.) (Emphasis added.) 
The Tax Commission's own correspondence admits to the ambiguity of which 
activities are subject to sales tax. On August 7, 1986, Jim Rogers, Director of the Auditing 
Division wrote a memorandum to Clyde R. Nichols, Executive Director (the 
"Memorandum"), a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A." The Memorandum 
begins: 
do so in the sales tax statute suggests its use is one of limitation. 
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The Auditing Division has for quite some time had some 
questions about which activities come under the definition of 
admission. Therefore, in December 1984 we asked the 
Commission to ask the Attorney General's Office to clarify the 
issue.3 
Applying the test as stated in Gould, this Court should construe the ambiguous 
statute in favor of the taxpayers and hold that the use of "including" was intended as a word 
of limitation. See also Sutherland Stat. Const. §66.01 (4th ed.) 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should hold that the 1933 Legislature used the 
word "including" as a term of limitation and therefore, none of the activities conducted at 
the Galleria are subject to sales tax since these activities do not involve the use of "seats and 
tables . . . and other similar accommodations." 
II. APPLICATION OF THE STATUTE VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION 
CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 
In the event this Court finds that the obligation to collect sales tax extends to any 
activities provided at the Galleria, the Court should also find that the application of the 
statute by the Tax Commission is unconstitutional as a violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment's equal protection clause. It is hornbook law that: 
The guiding principle most often stated by the courts is that the 
^ e record before this Court reflects the fact that the informal opinion prepared by the 
Attorney General's office was apparently suppressed once the Tax Commission determined 
it would be damaging to its ability to collect sales tax based upon the arbitrary method it 
was and is employing. A true and correct copy of the informal opinion is attached hereto 
as Exhibit "B." 
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constitutional guaranty of equal protection of the laws requires 
that all persons shall be treated alike under like circumstances 
and conditions, both in the privileges conferred and in the 
liabilities imposed. 
Equal protection in its guaranty of like treatment to all similarly 
situated permits classification which is reasonable and not 
arbitrary and which is based upon material and substantial 
differences having a reasonable relation to the objects or 
persons dealt with and the public purpose sought to be achieved 
by the legislation involved. 
16A AmJur 2d §738 (1979). 
The Receiver concedes that the statute at issue is most likely constitutional on its 
face and that the legislature can delegate to the Tax Commission, the power to make rules 
and regulations necessary to enforce the statute subject to confines of the statute. See §59-
12-118. However, in the enforcement of the statute, the Tax Commission, as a subsidiary 
and surrogate of the State of Utah, must enforce the statute in a non-discriminatory fashion 
or risk a constitutional challenge based on violation of the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
The Tax Commission has arbitrarily and without reasonable relation to the objective 
of the tax raising statute, enforced the law against only some of the identified class. As 
stated above, the law by its terms applies to "any place of amusement, entertainment, or 
recreation." By its terms, the class subject to the statute would include golfing, bowling, 
playing tennis or racquetball, yet all of these activities have currently been arbitrarily 
excluded from collection of sales tax. However, the Tax Commission has imposed sales tax 
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on receipts from swimming, skating and amusement park rides. 
Furthermore, the Tax Commission has admitted that such distinctions are arbitrary. 
In its Order (a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "C") the Tax 
Commission states: 
The Commission recognizes that distinctions between [bowling 
and batting cages] are difficult to draw. The exemption of 
bowling from sales tax is largely historical and perhaps would 
not exist if a fresh look at the issue were possible. Even so, the 
fact that receipts from bowling may have been excluded from 
taxation for historical reasons does not require that receipts 
from batting cages also be excluded . . . . 
Id at 3. 
Certainly, the exclusion of bowling or other activities from collection of sales tax 
based on "historical reasons" cannot justify treating the activities differently. If this were not 
so, no statutes would ever violate the equal protection clause since a "historical" justification 
could always be found. 
Since the statute in dispute involves an economic right, its constitutionality will 
be determined by application of the lowest level of scrutiny: the "rational basis test." Under 
this test, a "classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground 
of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that 
all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia. 
253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). The case in Royster involved the application of a tax against 
similarly situated entities wherein the taxing authority treated the corporations differently 
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without any rational basis for such distinctions. The court concluded: "[A] discriminatory 
tax law cannot be sustained against the complaint of a party aggrieved if the classification 
appear to be altogether illusory." (See also: Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.. 220 
U.S. 61, 82 (1911): A statute is unconstitutional when "found to be merely arbitrary 
mandates, or to discriminate invidiously between different persons in substantially the same 
situation."; Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.. 455 U.S. 422, 439-42 (1982) (Blackmun, J. 
concurring): "[T]he rational-basis standard is not a toothless one (citation omitted), the 
classificatory scheme must rationally advance a reasonable and identifiable government 
objective (citation omitted). . . . The State's rationale must be something more than the 
exercise of a strained imagination; while the connection between means and ends need not 
be precise, it, at the least, must have some objective basis."; Tussman & tenBroek, "The 
Equal Protection of the Laws," 37 Calif.L.Rev. 341 (1941), "The measure of the 
reasonableness of a classification is the degree of its success in treating similarly those 
similarly situated.") 
The Tax Commission has failed to articulate, nor can they, any rational basis for 
taxing, for example, batting cage admissions but not racquetball admissions. The record 
reflects that the Tax Commission has argued that the batting cages are taxable because a 
person is "admitted" to an "enclosed area." However, an admittee to a tennis or racquetball 
court is admitted to a more identifiable "enclosed area" than a participant of the batting 
cage, since netting in the batting cages only protects neighboring participants from stray balls 
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but does not otherwise limit the direction of the ball. In racquetball, the participant(s) and 
ball are confined to a large enclosed cube; four walls with a ceiling and floor. The exclusion 
of racquetball and tennis from collection of sales tax is arbitrary and violates the Tax 
Commission's own rule. As stated in Rule R865-19-34S, a "'place of amusement, 
entertainment, or recreation' is broad in meaning but conveys the basic idea of a definite 
location." Additionally, a racquetball or tennis court is a more "enclosed area" than is a 
skating rink or laser tag game, yet tennis and racquetball are not subject to the tax. Further, 
isn't a patron of a golfing range also admitted to a specific "tee" with appropriate fencing, 
netting and other barriers to protect other nearby golfers or members of the community? 
Obviously, any distinctions the Tax Commission can articulate are distinctions without 
substance and are therefore illusory. As stated by Justice Jackson in Railway Express 
Agency v. New York. 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1948): 
I regard it as a salutary doctrine that cities, states and the 
Federal Government must exercise their powers so as not to 
discriminate between their inhabitants except upon some 
reasonable differentiation fairly related to the object of 
regulation. This equality is not merely abstract justice. The 
framers of the Constitution knew, and we should not forget 
today, that there is no more effective practical guaranty against 
arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the 
principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority 
must be imposed generally. Conversely, nothing opens the door 
to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials to 
pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation 
Courts can take no better measure to assure that laws will 
be just than to require that laws be equal in operation. 
(Emphasis added.) 
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See also Zobel v. Williams. 457 U.S. 55 (1982). 
The Tax Commission can articulate no justification for treating so differently, 
activities that are so similar. Failing even to pass the "rational basis test," this Court should 
find that the Tax Commission's application of the statute is unconstitutional as a violation 
of equal protection. 
III. APPLICATION OF THE STATUTE VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF 
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION. 
The analysis required to determine the constitutionality of a statute under the due 
process clause of the 14th Amendment is substantially similar to the analysis under the 
equal protection clause. As stated in Nebbia v. New York. 291 U.S. 502.525 (1934): "[The] 
guaranty of due process . . . demands . . . that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary 
or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the 
object sought to be attained." 
The Tax Commission alleges that sales tax should have been collected on various 
activities at the Galleria and that the Galleria was negligent in its failure to collect and 
remit this tax. In the event that the Tax Commission's position is correct, a lien may be 
placed on the Galleria property and eventually foreclosed on to satisfy such lien. See §59-1-
302. Since this finding would certainly deprive the Galleria of a substantial property 
interest, the due process provisions must be satisfied. 
The "rational-basis test" under the due process clause requires that a law not be 
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unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious. As previously stated, the Tax Commission has 
arbitrarily and without any justification, taxed certain activities within the class of 
"amusement, entertainment, or recreation" (skating, swimming, batting cages and laser tag) 
yet have failed to tax other similarly situated activities within the same class (bowling, 
golfing, tennis and racquetball). The objective of the statute is obviously to raise additional 
revenue for the State. To arbitrarily exclude some of the activities falling within the subject 
class from the payment of sales tax, eviscerates that objective. Therefore, the Tax 
Commission's collection methods are unconstitutional under the due process clause of the 
14th Amendment. 
Additionally, the Tax Commission's collection methods are unconstitutional since the 
statue and rules as applied, fail to give adequate notice of required compliance. As stated 
by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Packard. 250 P.2d 561, 564 (Utah 1952): 
[T]he test a statute must meet to be valid is: It must be 
sufficiently definite (a) to inform persons of ordinary 
intelligence, who would be law abiding, what their conduct must 
be to conform to its requirements; (b) to advise a defendant 
accused of violating it just what constitutes the offense with 
which he is charged, and (c) to be susceptible of uniform 
interpretation and application by those charged with the 
responsibility of applying and enforcing it. 
The statute fails this due process test. Reasonable people can dispute the meaning 
of the phrase, "admission to any place of amusement, entertainment, or recreation, including 
seats and tables reserved or otherwise, and other similar accommodations." It was this very 
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confusion that cause the Galleria to fail to collect sales tax on the laser game. Additionally, 
as discussed above, the legislature's meaning of the word "including" is at best ambiguous. 
Furthermore, the Tax Commission's decision that the Galleria's bowling and miniature golf 
receipts are not subject to sales tax but other similarly situated activities allegedly are 
subject to such tax adds further confusion. Finally, by the Tax Commission's own admission, 
they are not sure of the "interpretation and application" of the statute. As stated in the 
Memorandum, "The Auditing Division has for quite some time had some questions about 
which activities come under the definition of admission." 
For the foregoing reasons, the statute and rules regarding the imposition, collection 
and remittance of sales tax are unconstitutional as violative of the 14th Amendment's due 
process clause. 
CONCLUSION - RELIEF SOUGHT 
The Receiver respectfully requests that this Court find that none of the activities 
conducted at the Galleria are subject to the collection and payment of Utah Sales Tax. 
In the alternative, if this Court should find that the activities conducted at the 
Galleria are subject to Utah Sales Tax, the Receiver respectfully requests that this Court 
find that the Tax Commission's methods of collection are unconstitutional. 
-^dav of DATED this JT^day February, 1993. 
, BURTON & THURMAN 
Stephen W. Rupp (j 
Attorneys for Intervenor 
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NOV 1 9 1990 -
APPEALS Sto . .v 
STATE TAX COMMiSSiOiv 
M E M O R A N D U M 
TO: CLYDE R. NICHOLS, JR 
Executive Director 
FROM: JIM ROGERS, Director 
Auditing Division 
DATE: August 7, 1986 
RE: Taxing Admissions 
The Auditing Division has for quite some time had some questions about 
which activities come under the definition of an admission. Therefore, in 
December 1984 we asked the Commission to ask the Attorney General's Office to 
clarify this issue. We wrote up the attached request for Commissioner 
Brunson. However, this is not the actual request. A copy of the final 
request did not come back to the Division. 
Also attached, is a copy of a draft response from the AG's Office. The 
draft was prepared in September 1985 and was discussed with the Auditing 
Division. The Division had some significant concerns with the draft opinion 
and the AG agreed to consider these further. We have had no word from the AG 
since that time. 
It is important to note that the AG's draft would have a detrimental 
effect on state revenues. Additionally, the draft leaves as many grey areas 
in admissions as we have now. 
Therefore, I am requesting that the Commission take these actions. First, 
the Commission could work with the AG to get a timely and sound opinion. 
Secondly, once the opinion was finalized, the Commission could rework the 
present rules on admissions. Third, the Commission could include in its 
legislative package any needed changes that could not be handled within the 
rule. 
It is important to note that an audit is being held up pending the 
resolution of the question. Additionally, there are other potential audits 
where this issue could be of significance. 
Please let me know of any decisions on this issue. The Division would 
like to be included in discussions as this problem is solved. 
llllLre 00000150 
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September 6, 1985 
Mr- Mark K. Buchi/ Chairman 
Utah State Tax Commission 
Heber M. Wells Office Building 
160 East 3 00 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84134 
RE: Attorney General Opinion No. 85-40 
Taxability of Admission and Special Events Fees 
Dear Mr. Buchi: 
The following Informal Opinion is in response to your 
letter of May 24/ 1985/ wherein you requested guidance as to the 
taxation of admission fees. This Opinion will set forth the 
fundamental rules that should govern the taxation of admissions 
receipts and then suggest changes in Tax Commission policy that 
will provide consistent application of the law. 
PACTS 
In Utah/ "amount (s) paid for admission to any place of 
amusement, entertainment/ or recreation" are subject to sales 
tax. Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-4(d). Further, the definition of 
"admission" states that it "includes seats and tables reserved or 
otherwise, and other similar accommodations and charges made 
therefore." Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-2(9). While at first blush 
it appears that the application of these legislative provisions 
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would be simple, problems surrounding the "admissions tax" have 
burdened the Tax Commission and its staff for many years. 
For example, the Tax Commission presently imposes the 
admissions tax on charges made for swimming pool use, skating 
rink fees, and amusement park rides* However, golfing green 
fees, receipts from bowling alleys, and court fees (tennis/ 
racquetball/ squash/ etc.) are not taxed. According to the Tax 
Commission/ the reason for distinguishing the above-categorized 
activities is not necessarily grounded in legal reasoning; 
rather, it is the result of varying practices and interpretations 
of successive administrations which/ over the years/ have rooted 
themselves into the policies of the Commission. Further, the 
legislative provision that defines "admission" and the Tax 
Commission Rule that defines "place of amusement, entertainment, 
or recreation" are nebulous and difficult to apply in practical 
situations, thus adding to the confusion surrounding the 
admissions tax. 
The difficulty of these problems has made the 
application of the admissions tax unclear in new amusement 
situations such as batting cages, video arcades, and the like. 
Therefore, this Opinion was requested by the Commission so that 
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an understandable statement of tire law can be consistently and 
correctly applied with regard to the admissions tax. 
Throughout this Opinion, reference is made to the 
phrase "seats and tables reserved or otherwise/ and other similar 
accommodations." For purposes of brevity, we have generically 
referred to this entire quotation as "seats and tables" or 
"seats/tables." However, we imply therein that all such seats 
and tables, reserved or otherwise/ and other similar 
accommodations (benches, stools/ bleachers/ etc.) are included. 
Likewise, we have used "amusement activity" to refer to the 
phrase "place of amusement, entertainment, or recreation." 
ISSUE 
What are the principles and standards for determination 
with respect to the admissions tax? 
DISCUSSION 
A. Introduction 
The "admissions tax" was promulgated as part of the 
Emergency Revenue Act of 1933. Other than changes in the taxing 
rate, the language of the provision has remained substantially 
the same: "fT]here is levied and there shall be collected and 
paid: (d) A tax . • . of the amount paid for admission to any 
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place of amusement, entertainment, or recreation." Utah Code 
Ann. S 59-15-4(d). The term "admission" is legislatively defined 
in Utah Code Ann. section 59-15-2(9): "'Admission1 includes 
seats and tables reserved or otherwise, and other similar 
accommodations and charges made therefore." For the most part, 
the problems which face us in applying the admissions tax stem 
from the determination of what constitutes an "admission." 
Since the controlling source of law in this issue is 
the Utah Code's applicable provisions sections 59-15-4(d) and 5 9-
15-2(9), the major question to be decided is whether the Utah 
Legislature intended to strictly limit "admission" to only 
include activities where the participant uses "seats and tables" 
to enjoy "amusement, entertainment, or recreation/ or if 
itemizing the use of seats and tables is merely an example of one 
type of an "admission." If the former is true, then the current 
Tax Commission practice of taxing the receipts from- swimming pool 
and skating rink charges is improper. However, if the latter is 
true, then the Tax Commission may be in error by not taxing some 
activities that should be subject to the tax (e.g., green fees, 
bowling receipts, and court fees). 
B. Analysis of Utah Statutes 
Since the subject legislative provisions were handed 
down as law in 1933, no written documentation of legislative 
Hark K. Buchi 
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history is available to aid in determining the legislature's 
intent (written documentation begins in 1953) . Therefore, to 
determine the intent of the Utah Legislature, we must apply 
accepted rules of statutory construction. 
The Utah Legislature's definition of "admissions" 
states that "admission includes,* As noted earlier, the question 
we must resolve is whether the term "includes" should be a term 
of enlargement, indicating that an "admission" could be something 
else besides the charge for use of seats or tables; or whether 
the tenh "includes" should be a word of limitations where an 
admission could only be that situation where seats, tables, or 
similar accommodations were used in order to enjoy the amusement 
activity. 
A majority of court holdings state that the word 
"includes" is a word of expansion and enlargement and not one of 
restriction or limitation. .£££, e.g. , Schwab v. Ariyoshi, 58 Haw. 
25, 564 P.2d 135, (1977); Lyman v. Town of Bow Mar, 188 Colo. 
216, 533 P.2d 1129, (1975); GreyhaxmA Lin^c, Xnc, v. City of 
Chicago, 24 111. App.3d 718, 321 M.E. 2d 293 (1974). Neverthe-
less, considering the context in which the word is used, it can 
be and often is a word of limitation. See, e.g., Premier 
Products Co. v. Cameron, 240 Or, 123, 400 P.2d 227 (1965). 
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In State v. Monticello Salt Company, 98 P. 549, 34 Dtah 458 
(190 8)/ the Dtah Supreme court stated that: 
The word "including/" according to common usage, 
is susceptible to different shades of meaning. 
It may be used in the sense to comprise or 
embrace; to confine or to contain; to express 
the idea that a thing in question constitutes a 
part only of the contents of some other thing; 
as a word of enlargement, and ordinarily imply-
ing that something else has been given beyond 
the general language which precedes it; to add 
to the general clause a species which does not 
naturally belong to it. It is frequently used 
as the equivalent of "also." 
Therefore, in Dtah, the use of the word "includes" is not 
apositive as to whether the term "admissions" as used in section 
59-15-2(9) is exclusive or exemplary of an admission. We must 
examine the context of the usage and other factors to determine 
the meaning of the word "includes." 
First, the only item listed as an admission is the 
charge for seats and tables, as opposed to a common usage of 
"includes" as a term of enlargement where a list of several items 
are given as an example of what the term means. Second, we 
should note that the phrase "and other similar accommodations" is 
modifying the nouns seats or tables and not modifying the term 
"admission" itself, which would indicate that "includes" was used 
as a term of enlargement. Third, nowhere in the definition is it 
Mark K. Buchi 
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stated that the term includes seats or tables, but is not limited 
to charges for seats and tables- Fourth, had the legislature 
intended that the term "admission" would mean something more than 
the charge for seats and tables, it could have easily stated 
otherwise. Finally, considering the time when the definition of 
"admission" and the admission tax itself were promulgated, using 
the common base of seats and tables as the standard for 
determining whether an activity was an admission was likely 
reasonable. Video arcades, batting cages, public golf courses, 
etc., were non-existent in 1933. The major source of amusement 
and entertainment was the theater, picture shows, and sporting 
events. Defining admission as a charge made for seats and 
tables, therefore, was adequate. 
These factors indicate that the term "includes" should 
be a term of limitations and the Utah Legislature's intent was to 
limit the admissions tax applicability to only those activities 
wherein seats and tables were necessary to the enjoyment of the 
amusement activity. 
Moreover, one of the most well-established rules of 
statutory construction with regard to taxing statutes is that the 
rule of strict construction must be applied against the taxing 
authority and in favor of the taxpayer. Therefore, taxing 
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statutes will not be extended beyond the clear and reasonable 
interpretation of their language and if a taxing statute is of 
doubtful intent^ it must be construed favorable to the taxpayer. 
Sutherland Stat. Const. § 66.01 (4th Ed.). This rule of 
statutory construction is clearly applicable to the Utah 
Legislative provision section 59-15-4(d) which taxes admission 
Additionally, the very Tax Commission Rule (S33) that 
interprets the statutory definition of "admission" limits its 
substantive content and list of examples to those situations 
which are only covered by a strictly construed intrepretation of 
"admission": 
a. The term "admission" means the right or 
privilege to enter into a place including seats 
and tables reserved or otherwise and.other 
similar accommodations and charges made there-
for. The amount paid for the right to use a 
reserved seat or any seat in an auditorium, 
theater, circus, stadium, schoolhouse, meeting 
house or gymnasium to view any type of enter-
tainment is taxable. The right to use a table 
at a night club, hotel or roof garden is taxable 
whether such charge is designated as a cover 
charge .or any such similar charge, and the 
amount paid for such right is subject to the 
tax. This is true whether the charge made for 
the use of the seat, table, or similar accommo-
dation is combined with an Admission charge 
proper to form a single charge, or is separate 
and distinct from an admission charge, or is 
itself the sole charge. 
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This Sales Tax Rule implies no application of the 
admissions tax to amusement activities whose fee is for other 
than the use of seats and tables. 
Therefore, considering all of the above factors, it is 
the opinion of the Dtah Attorney General that the term 
"admission," as defined by the Dtah Legislature, is strictly 
limited to those situations where seats, tables/ or similar 
seating facilities are used by the patrons to engage in the 
amusement activity. To be subject to the admissions tax of 
section 59-15-4(d)/ the definition/ as above construed/ must be 
satisfied. 
C. Application to Current Practice 
Construing the definition of "admission" to be limited 
to the charge made for use of seats/ tables/ etc., will require 
that the Tax Commission change some of its present taxing 
policies with regard to the admissions tax. Subjecting any 
activity to the admissions tax which does not require the use of 
some type of seating facility is not in accord with the 
restrictive definition of "admission." If the fee charged is not: 
an "admission" as that term is defined bv section 59-15-2(9) and 
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interpreted by this Opinion/ then neither can it be an "admission 
to a place of amusement/ entertainment or recreation." 
The charge paid for use of a seat or table at a 
theater, movier stadium, gymnasium, schoolhouse, nightclub, and 
other similar places is clearly subject to the admissions tax 
Also, the price paid to ride on amusement devices located at 
amusement parks, carnivals or fairs is taxable (this is true 
whether the price paid is for an individual rid or unlimited 
use) , as is the cost of a ski lift ticket. 
However, participation in activities such as golf, 
bowling, swimming, skating, tennis, racquetball, etc., cannot be 
taxed by section 5 9-15-4(d) since they fail to meet the 
definition of "admission" in that the fee paid to participate in 
this type of recreation is not for the use of any seat or table. 
Incidental use of a seat or table may occur, but fee paid for 
these activities is primarily for use of the facilities. To 
comport with the statutory definition of "admission," the use of 
seats or tables must be necessary or customary in order to view 
the amusement, entertainment, or recreation. 
In situations where the use of a seat and/or table is 
only partial, the Tax Commission will need to determine whether 
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the use of the seat/table is incidental or necessary to enjoyment 
of the activity* If the use is incidental/ then the admissions 
tax will not apply; if the use is necessary, then the admissions 
tax will apply. 
Therefore, the restrictive term "admission" will 
continue to tax many of the same activities, but will require 
that the Tax Commission alter its taxing policies where they have 
been imposing the admissions tax on certain participative 
activities (e.g., swimming and skating). 
D. Practical Considerations 
This Opinion has set forth what we believe the proper 
statement of the law in Utah is, according to Otah statute, with 
respect to the admissions tax of Utah Code Ann. section 5 9-15-
4(d) and 59-15-2(9). However, because of the unusual manner in 
which the definition of "admission" was written and the rules of 
statutory construction which control/ our interpretation is 
narrow and, therefore/ does not tax the large spectrum of 
"admission fees" that for all practical reasons should be subject 
to the tax. The present standards for determination of the 
admissions tax, though they be the standards we must apply, are 
simply inadequate today. 
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Common sense tells us that the price which a patron 
pays to go swimming, skating golfing, bowling, and a host of 
other charges, should logically be subject to the admissions tax. 
This notion is present in Attorney General Opinion No. 78-259 
wherein Assistant Attorney General Hark Buchi stated that it was 
the duty of a state municipality to "collect a sales tax on the 
admission price to the swimming pool golf curse and any other 
city-owned recreation facilities.* This conclusion seemed so 
clear that, other than applying section 59-15-4(d) and the Sales 
Tax Regulations, no detailed analysis was done. 
Further, the Tax Commission passed a Sales Tax Rule 
(S47) which states that "Eclharges imposed on persons admitted to 
swimming pools, skating rinks and other places of amusement are 
subject to tax." Also, in defining what the phrase "place of 
amusement, entertainment, or recreation" means, the Commission 
said in Sales Tax Rule S34 that "[tlhe amount paid for admission 
to such a place is subject to the tax even though such charge 
includes the right of the purchaser to participate in some 
activity within the place." These actions on the part of the Tax 
Commission indicate that, even though hesitant about taking the 
admissions tax into all participative activities, limiting the 
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tax to only those situations where seats/tables are needed is an 
arbitrary and unfair segregation of amusement and recreational 
activities-
We are not the only state that has had to relegate 
itself to applying a narrowly-written admissions tax. In Graiier 
v. Director of Revenue, 193 Kan. 605, 396 P.2d 260 (1964), the 
Kansas Supreme Court refused to impose the Kansas admissions tax 
on bowling alley receipts where the tax was levied against "the 
sale of admissions to any place of amusement/ entertainment, or 
recreation." The Kansas statutes gave no definition of the term 
"admission/" so the court adopted a standard dictionary 
definition stating that "admission" meant "3a: an act of 
admitting: the fact of being admitted: permission or right to 
enter . . . . 4: price of entrance: fee paid at or for 
entering." 
In response to the argument of the Kansas Attorney 
General that the tax should also apply to the price charged for 
participation in the recreation of bowling, the court held that 
the charge for participation was not the same as a charge for 
entrance to a place: 
[W]hat the legislature taxed . . . was the 
price of admission to enter a place of amuse-
ment, entertainment or recreation. Had the 
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legislature by its enactment intended to 
impose a tax on charges for participation in 
such activities as bowling, it could have 
easily done so. The fact that it did not do 
so is persuasive that it was not the intention 
of the legislature to impose a tax on charges 
made for participation in the recreational 
activities. 
id- at p. 264 (emphasis in original)-. The Utah Legislature's 
definition of "admission" is even more limiting than the 
dictionary definition adopted in Grauer, since the Grauer 
standard of "fee for entrance" is even broader than Utah's "fee 
for use of seats/tables." 
The resolution of this tangled problem is to either: 
1. redefine the term "admission" (section 59-15-2(9)) to include 
a standard meaning "price paid for entrance," as in Grauer and to 
include therein "the price paid to participate in the amusement, 
entertainment, or recreational activity"; or 2. to specifically 
identify in section 59-15-4 (d) the activities to be covered by 
the tax, stating that the list is not exclusive but exemplary. 
Either of these approaches will provide a fair, understandable, 
and workable statute. 
However, for the time being we must suffer with the 
present: definition of "admission" as it is found in section 59-
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15-2(9). The customs and practices of society changef but 
unfortunately statutes are often not updated and revised to keep 
up with those changes. Neither the Tax Commission or the 
Attorney General's Office has the authority to ignore the laws of 
this state and tax activities beyond the scope of those laws. 
The proper remedy of this dilemma must be left to the Utah 
Legislature. 
CONCLUSION 
As defined in Utah Code Ann. section 5 9-15-2(9), the 
term "admission* is strictly inclusive only of a charge for the 
use of seats, tables or other similar accommodations. Unless the 
"admission fee" is for this use, the admissions tax of section 
59-15-4 (d) cannot be imposed. Further, to engage in or enjoy the 
amusement activity, it must be customary or necessary to use 
seats, tables or other similar accommodations. 
Currently, the Tax Commission is imposing the 
admissions tax on the charges paid to enter a swimming pool or 
skating rink. The imposition of the admissions tax on these 
charges goes beyond the taxing authority granted by section 5 9-
15-4(d), since the charges do not meet the definition of 
"admission" as described above. 
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This Opinion recognizes that the definition of 
"admission" which we must apply is inadequate and does not tax 
many activities that should fall within the admissions tax. 
Confusion^ inconsistency, and arbitrary distinctions are the 
result of applying this definition. Nevertheless/ the Tax 
Commission/ like the Attorney Generalfs Office/ is bound by the 
provisions of the Dtah codef specifically/ section 59-15-2(9) 
with respect to the admissions tax. We cannot ignore/ change or 
exercise authority beyond what that section allows. 
Therefore, the definition of "admission" is restricted 
to include only the charge imposed for the use of seats, tables 
or other similar accommodations Unless a fee meets this 
definition/ the admissions tax of Utah Code Ann. section 59-15-
4(d) is not applicable. If the Dtah Legislature desires, it may 
revise that definition to be more inclusive of present 
activities. 
Sincerely, 
Bryce H. Pettey 
A s s i s t a n t Attorney General 
Tax & Business Regulation Div. 
BHP/rrm 
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BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
THE 49TH STREET GALLERIA, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
AUDITING DIVISION OF THE 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
ORDER 
Appeal No. 90-1055 
Account No. D149 26 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission 
upon a Petition for Reconsideration, da'ced December 10, 1991, filed 
by the Petitioner as a result of the Commission's final decision 
dated November 20, 1991. 
FINDINGS 
i. Utah Administrative Rule R86l-1-5A(P) provides that 
a Petition for Reconsideration Mwill allege as grounds for 
reconsideration either a mistake in law or fact, or the discovery 
of new evidence.M Under this rule, the Tax Commission may exercise 
its discretion in granting or denying a Petition for 
Reconsideration. The points raised in Petitioner's Petition for 
Reconsideration are discussed below, in the order of their 
presentation. 
2. Petitioner argues that because it was advised by 
Audit Division staff that several of its other activities were not 
subject to sales tax, Petitioner was justified in concluding that 
ATTACHMENT 2 
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its laser chase game was also not taxable. Petitioner's argument 
overlooks the fact that it had also been advised by others on the 
Audit Division staff that its activities were subject to sales tax. 
Petitioner chose to accept the advice to its liking and reject the 
contrary advice. Then, without further discussion of the matter 
with Audit Division stafff Petitioner concluded that the laser 
chase game was also not subject to tax. The laser chase game had 
not existed when Audit Division staff initially reviewed 
Petitioner's operation. 
In its previous Order, the Commission waived retroactive 
application of sales tax to those specific activities where 
Petitioner received conflicting advice from different members of 
Audit Division staff. Petitioner did not receive conflicting 
advice regarding the taxability of the laser chase game. The 
Commission therefore reaffirms its decision that the laser chase 
game is subject to sales tax. 
3. Petitioner also contends the Commission did not 
respond to its challenge to the administration rules under which 
sales tax was imposed on Petitioner's various activities. In 
effect, Petitioner argues that such rules exceed the scope of 
Utah's Sales Tax Act. The Commission recognizes that payment of 
sales tax cannot be required other than as authorized by the Sales 
Tax Act. However, the Commission is authorized to prescribe rules 
in conformity with the Act to ascertain and assess the tax imposed 
-2-
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by the Act. (See Utah Code Ann. §59-12-118.) The rules upon which 
the assessment was made in this case are an application of the 
foregoing rulemaking authority. The rules themselves have remained 
unchanged for many years, with no legislative direction to the 
contrary. The Commission therefore finds no merit in Petition's 
challenge to those rules. 
4. Petitioner contends that §59-12-103(1)(f) of the 
Sales Tax Act and the administrative rules pertaining to that 
portion of the Act are unconstitutionally vague. Petitioner has 
framed its objections in conclusionary language, with no citation 
of authority and minimal analysis. The Commission therefore 
rejects Petition's challenge uo the constitutionality of the 
statute and rules. 
5. Petitioner further argues that no logical distinction 
can be drawn between bowling, which is not subject to sales tax, 
and batting cages, which are subject to tax. The Commission 
recognizes that distinctions between the two activities are 
difficult tc draw. The exemption of bowling from sales tax is 
largely historical and perhaps would not exist if a fresh look at 
the issue were possible. Even so, the fact that receipts from 
bowling may have been excluded from taxation for historical reasons 
does not require that receipts from batting cages also be excluded, 
where such receipts are otherwise subject to sales tax under the 
Sales Tax Act. 
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6. The Petitioner also contends that it has overpaid 
other sales taxes and is therefore entitled to an offset against 
the sales tax liability imposed by the audit which is the subject 
of this appeal. The Petitioner did not pursue such a position 
during the hearing in this matter, nor has any specific claim for 
refund been submitted. Petitioner may claim such a refund in the 
manner provided by law and regulation. 
7. Finally, the Commission must correct Petitioner's 
misstatements regarding a draft informal opinion prepared during 
1985 by an Assistant Utah Attorney General. Petitioner contends 
the Commission concealed the opinion because it was favorable to 
Petitioner's position. First, the so called opinion is merely a 
draft that was never signed, never approved by the Attorney General 
and never accepted by the Commission. Second, the Commission has 
made no effort to conceal the draft. The Petitioner has a copy of 
the draft, which has been made a part of the record in this matter. 
The draft is not binding on the Commission, and the Commission has 
rejected its conclusions for the reasons stated in the Commission's 
original decision. 
Appeal No. 90-1055 
DECISION AND ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing, it is the decision and order of 
the Utah State Tax Commission that the Petition for Reconsideration 
is denied. It is so ordered. 
DATED this f/y day of 'fflfo/t/CA-*' / 199 2. 
/ 
DER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
* 6 ^ 
n 
B. Pacheco 
Commi s s ioner 
sO"fhlAiMlMS^ 
/ S. Bla ine Willes 
Commissioner 
NOTICE: Ycu have thirty (30) days after the date of final order to 
file in Supreme Court a petition for judicial review. Utah Code 
Ann. §§63-465-13(1), 63-46b-14 (2) (a) . .--^""7: 
ANad/90- tCSS.ort '-•Vs' V & . \ 
I * i* 
^ 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Decision to the following: 
49th Street Galleria 
c/o LaVar Christensen 
4998 South 360 West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84123 
Craig Sandberg 
Assistant Director, Auditing 
Heber M. Wells Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84134 
James H. Rogers 
Director, Auditing Div. 
Heber M. Wells Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84134 
Rick Carlton 
Assistant Attorney General 
36 South State, 11th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
DATED this / ^ day of "x^C->^A , 1992. 
&rts2<7?-K 
Secretaj 
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